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Magic tricks violate the expected causal relationships that form an implicit belief system
about what is possible in the world around us. Observing a magic effect seemingly
invalidates our implicit assumptions about what action causes which outcome. We aimed
at identifying the neural correlates of such expectation violations by contrasting 24 video
clips of magic tricks with 24 control clips in which the expected action-outcome relationship
is upheld. Using fMRI, we measured the brain activity of 25 normal volunteers while they
watched the clips in the scanner. Additionally, we measured the professional magician who
had performed the magic tricks under the assumption that, in contrast to naïve observers,
the magician himself would not perceive his own magic tricks as an expectation violation.
As the main effect of magic – control clips in the normal sample, we found higher activity
for magic in the head of the caudate nucleus (CN) bilaterally, the left inferior frontal gyrus
and the left anterior insula. As expected, the magician’s brain activity substantially differed
from these results, with mainly parietal areas (supramarginal gyrus bilaterally) activated,
supporting our hypothesis that he did not experience any expectation violation. These
ﬁndings are in accordance with previous research that has implicated the head of the
CN in processing changes in the contingency between action and outcome, even in the
absence of reward or feedback.
Keywords: expectation violation,magic, fMRI, caudate nucleus, perceptual prediction error,movement observation,
action
INTRODUCTION
A deep need of humans is to predict future events. This abil-
ity, technically speaking causal reasoning, helps us to navigate
in a complex world. Although it is questioned whether our con-
scious will actually controls our actions (Wegner, 2002), it is clear
that the perception of causality exists. Evidence from develop-
mental psychology tells us that infants can discriminate causal
from non-causal events (Michotte, 1963). In so-called violation-
of-expectation tasks, even young infants try to predict the outcome
of observed events as evidenced by their looking longer at trials
which violate their expectations (e.g., Wang et al., 2004). Over
time, humans acquire a broad knowledge base that is constantly
enlarged, modiﬁed, and updated. Relying on prior knowledge is
helpful for learning, for problem solving, for decision making
and for more effective action selection (e.g., Ericsson et al., 1993;
Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996; Bilalic´ et al., 2012). To a large extent,
this knowledge base consists of the knowledge of causal relations
between action and outcome. Long-established causal relations
like this one are typically no longer questioned, and not even
explicitly represented. This makes the case of magic so interesting:
predictions about the outcome of observed actions and violations
of these predictions are key ingredients in magic. Magic tricks
provide counterfactual evidence to our prior knowledge about
objects, how they can be handled and about the set of possible
outcomes. Let us consider the following magic trick: sitting at a
table, the magician takes an egg from an egg box. He throws it on
the ﬂoor – and it jumps back into his hands, undamaged. To prove
that it is a real egg, he then breaks it and empties the content into a
glass. This is astonishing. We have learnt, probably from our own
experience, that if we throw an egg to the ﬂoor, it will break and
not jump. The observed event strongly violates the expected rela-
tionship between action (throwing egg to the ﬂoor) and outcome
(broken egg).
Before we discuss the possible neural basis of the violation-of-
expectation that is present in magic tricks, a short clariﬁcation of
terms is needed. The term“expectation violation” is used in differ-
ent contexts from developmental psychology (e.g., Wang et al.,
2004) and neuroeconomics (e.g., Chang and Sanfey, 2009) to
motor control (e.g., Grush, 2004), and thus refers to very dif-
ferent types of expectations. For the purposes of this paper, we
deﬁne “expectation violation” as the violation of the expected
action outcome in a magic trick. This means, the observer watches
an entire action sequence and expects a certain outcome – but
another outcome is presented.
The brain areas recruited for expectation violation reﬂect the
nature of the task at hand (Bubic et al., 2009). Thus, an anatom-
ical hypothesis can be derived from the very ﬁrst (and only)
study that investigated hemodynamic activity during magic tricks.
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 84 | 1
Danek et al. Expectation violation in magic
Contrasting magic tricks with situations in which the expected
relationship between action sequence and effect was upheld,
Parris et al. (2009) reported activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The
ACC is a key area known to mediate cognitive conﬂict (e.g., Kerns
et al., 2004). This ﬁts with results from another fMRI study that
found ACC activated when inconsistent information was pre-
sented (Fugelsang and Dunbar, 2005). This is supported by several
electrophysiological studies (e.g., Holroyd, 2004), for example
Huster et al. (2010) reported the cingulate cortex to be the neural
generator of the N200, the event-related potential reliably trig-
gered by Go/Nogo tasks (e.g., Johnstone et al., 2007). However,
we believe that Parris et al.’s (2009) study cannot fully answer
the question of what brain regions support magic trick expec-
tation violations because their analysis was restricted to only one
time point (the discrete time point of the moment of surprise).
We argue that although the moment of expectation violation is
traceable to a speciﬁc time point, expectations related to the
magic trick are built up over the entire clip. In order to have
expected motor outcomes violated, the entire sequence of pre-
ceding events is also taken into account. Otherwise magicians
would only have to present one speciﬁc movement as a “trick”
and not the sequence of movements leading up to the single
event that violates the already built-up expectancy. For exam-
ple, in the magic trick described above, the action of breaking
the egg and emptying its content into a glass would not vio-
late any expectations, if the egg had not previously been tossed
to the ﬂoor and jumped up again. It is possible that different
but overlapping cognitive processes are active throughout the
entire magic trick and at the speciﬁc moment of surprise. For
this reason, we decided to also look at the complete time win-
dow of each clip, besides analyzing the speciﬁc time point of
surprise.
Another possible candidate region that could subserve the func-
tion of signaling expectation violation is the caudate nucleus (CN).
Tricomi et al. (2004) conducted a series of fMRI experiments to
disentangle reward-related caudate activity and found that the
CN was only active in tasks with a perceived contingency between
action and outcome. If the outcome was thought to be unrelated
to the previous action, CN was not active. A comprehensive review
(including anatomical, behavioral, and imaging studies on healthy
controls and patients as well as on animals; Grahn et al., 2008)
focusing on the head of the CN sketches its cognitive functions as
follows: in contrast to the putamen that is thought to be responsi-
ble for more rigid habit learning, the CN is responsible for ﬂexible
action-outcome learning, in particular when task contingencies
change. It subserves a goal-directed response system that mon-
itors the outcome of an action and responds to changes in the
contingency between action and outcome. As discussed, magic
tricks overturn the learnt contingencies between initial action and
expected effect. We expect that this mismatch will activate the CN.
The aim of the present study is to replicate parts of a previous
study using a similar paradigm (Parris et al., 2009) with a larger
set of magic tricks (24 instead of 13) and a stronger magnet (3
Tesla instead of 1.5). In contrast to the previous study (Parris
et al., 2009), we were additionally interested in ongoing activity
throughout the entire magic trick, which should correlate with
the build-up of an expectation about the contingency between
action and outcome. To further investigate the expectation vio-
lation in magic tricks, we measured the professional magician
(Thomas Fraps) that had performed the magic tricks, as a single
case baseline. In order to be able to ﬂawlessly present magic effects,
magicians invest in many years of training. The “choreography,”
i.e., the secret as well as the ofﬁcial action sequence of each spe-
ciﬁc trick must be learnt through many repetitions. Depending
on the difﬁculty of the trick and the experience of the magician, a
conservative estimate by Thomas Fraps is that 150–200 repetitions
are required. The individual gestures are also practiced separately.
We therefore assumed that, in contrast to the naïve observer, the
magician himself should not show any expectation violation due
to his familiarity with the entire action sequence of each trick.
We hypothesize that the magician’s brain activity will differ from
that of the experimental group. Contrasting events that violate
action-outcome expectations with control events without expec-
tation violation, we hypothesize to ﬁnd higher activity in the CN,
the DLPFC, and the ACC.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty ﬁve healthy right-handed adults (mean age: 26 years, range
21–35 years; 10 male) participated in this experiment. In addition,
the right-handed magician that created the magic tricks (male,
age 46) also participated in the study. Before beginning the exper-
iment, participants were given a detailed informed consent form
describing the study, as well as discomforts and potential risks of
functional MRI. After agreeing to participate in the study, partici-
pants were additionally orally instructed about the details of their
task. Participants were monetarily compensated for their time.
Participants had no history of neurological disease, and were not
taking medication at the time. All participants understood the
instructions without difﬁculty. Participants had no knowledge of
the solutions to the magic tricks at the time of the experiment and
had no expertise as magicians. The study was performed in accor-
dance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the ethics
committee of the medical faculty of the Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universität Munich. None of the participants were excluded from
the analysis.
TESTING MATERIAL AND TASK
Magic tricks
We used 24 short video clips of magic tricks, two more clips were
shown in the practice trials. They had been performed by a profes-
sional magician (Thomas Fraps) and recorded in a standardized
theater setting. The magician whose appearance (e.g., shirt) was
kept identical during the recording sessions was shown on stage,
either seated behind or standing behind a table, see Figure 1.
The background was a black curtain. The set of tricks included
different magic effects (e.g., appearance, levitation, restoration,
vanish) and methods (e.g., sleight of hand, gimmicks, optical
illusions) and are described in detail in the Supplementary Mate-
rial. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3B6ZxNROuNw for
a sample trick clip. We used short tricks, with only one effect and
one key method. Clip duration ranged from 6.3 to 42.5 s. This
set of tricks had previously been tested to ensure that all tricks
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FIGURE 1 | Standardized setting shortly before the magic trick (here:
Rubik’s Cube) is performed.
were understandable, i.e., that participants perceived the intended
magic effect. This is an important prerequisite for actually expe-
riencing expectation violations. Further, the tricks consisted only
of visual effects that could be performed in absolute silence, with
no other interactive elements necessary (e.g., assistant, interac-
tion with the audience). Thus, the fMRI signal was only measured
during visual, not auditory processing. Further details about the
development of these stimuli can be found in a previous paper
(Danek et al., 2014).
Control clips
For each magic trick, we provided a corresponding control clip
(see full list in the Supplementary Material). We made sure that
the same general action sequence was shown, but with no magic
effect and thus without expectation violation. For example, in the
vanishing coin trick (see list), the magician presents three coins in
his hand. He closes the hand, shakes it and opens it to reveal that
only two coins are left. In the control clip, the magician presents
three coins in his hand. He closes the hand, shakes it and opens it
to reveal all three coins. Thus, in the control clip, the expectation
that all three coins should be still there is not violated.
Piloting the testing material
A pilot study was conducted to ensure that the observed events
in the magic clips triggered a feeling of surprise and expectation
violation. Fifteen independent observers (that did not take part in
the subsequent fMRI study, mean age: 24 years, range 20–27 years;
5 male) watched all clips (the 24 trick clips as well as the 24 control
clips, in randomized order) and rated them on a scale from 1 (not
at all) to 4 (very much) for how surprising the clip was, how much
it involved illusion, howmuch it violated the lawof cause and effect
and whether the magician’s actions led to an unexpected outcome.
On average, the magic clips were rated as follows: surprise 2.94
(SD = 0.3), illusion 3.15 (SD = 0.3), violation of law of cause and
effect 3.16 (SD = 0.3), and unexpected outcome 2.86 (SD = 0.3).
In contrast, the control clips were rated much lower: surprise 1.19
(SD = 0.2), illusion 1.03 (SD = 0.1), violation of law of cause and
effect 1.03 (SD = 0.1), and unexpected outcome 1.17 (SD = 0.1).
These differences between magic and control clips with regard
to the ratings were all statistically signiﬁcant (t-tests for repeated
measures, all p < 0.01). Another sample of 15 participants (one
of them had to be excluded as an outlier) was presented with both
the magic and the control clips (see below) in randomized order
and indicated after each clip whether they had seen a magic trick
or not. Collapsed across all clips from the same condition (magic
or control), 89.7% of all participants identiﬁed the magic clips
correctly as magic clips and 98.3% of them correctly identiﬁed
the control clips as such. Thus, compared to the control clips,
participants found the magic tricks more surprising, involving
more illusion and unexpected outcomes, more strongly violating
the law of cause and effect, and they could distinguish them from
the control clips.
Color task
We also introduced a cognitive task that had nothing to do with
magic tricks, in order to allow activity to return to baseline between
blocks, but keep attentional demands at a constant level. A color
decision task was presented at the end of each block. Different col-
ored squares (red, orange, yellow, green, blue, and violet) appeared
on the screen and participants indicated whether the square was
a primary color (red, yellow, blue) or not (primary color = left,
other color = right). Directly after their response, the next square
appeared. Feedback was provided during training, but not during
the experiment.
PROCEDURE
Stimuli were presented in 24 randomized blocks. Each block con-
sistedof onemagic trick and the corresponding control clip, in ran-
domized order. In other words, if the control clip were presented
ﬁrst, then the speciﬁc magic trick corresponding to that control
clip would follow. This was done to reduce the time between con-
secutive presentations of the same condition, and to minimize
the likelihood that subjects would associate ﬁlms between blocks.
After watching the ﬁrst clip, participants were already aware of the
nature of the second clip, so the order of the clips was taken into
account during analysis (see Data Analysis). With this design, the
expectation violation related to the magic trick is separable from
the expectation of the type of clip presented, since the nature of
the magic trick (e.g., vanishing, transposition, physical impossi-
bility etc. – see Supplementary Material) is unknown regardless of
whether participants know that a magic trick will be shown.
Figure 2 shows the procedure of one block plus subsequent
color task. The block started with the outline of a white rectangle
(the same size and shape as the video clips) on a black background,
which was presented for 1000 ms (±300 ms). Then the magic and
the control clip followed in randomized order. The outlinewas also
presented after each clip. Afterward the color taskwas presented for
16 s between blocks. Subject responses were only required during
the color task. For the magic and the control clip, participants
were instructed to passively watch the videos. Two practice blocks
with feedback were performed outside the scanner. The entire
experimental session lasted about 90 min, with 60 min spent in
the scanner.
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FIGURE 2 | Procedure of one block including color task.
MATERIAL
Visual stimuli were projectedwith a LCDprojector (Christie LX40,
Christie Digital Systems, USA) with a True XGA 1024 × 768
system onto a back-projection screen placed behind partici-
pants in the MR-scanner. Participants viewed the projection
through a mirror placed 14 cm above them at 45◦. The dis-
tance from the mirror to the screen was 26 cm for a hori-
zontal visual ﬁeld of view of 25◦. The experiment was run
in Matlab 7.5.0 (R2007b, The Mathworks, Inc.) with Cogent
Graphics developed by John Romaya at the LON at the Well-
come Department of Imaging Neuroscience. The experiment was
controlled from a 64 bit Windows 7 personal computer (Dell
Precision M4500) with an NVIDIA Quadro FX 1800M Graphics
card.
fMRI DATA ACQUISITION
Images were acquired with a 3T MRI Scanner (Signa HDx, GE
Healthcare, Milwaukee, WI, USA) using a standard 8-channel
head coil. Thirty-seven contiguous transverse slices (slice thickness
3.5 mm, no gap) were acquired using a gradient echo echo-planar-
imaging (EPI) sequence (TR 2.0 s, TE 40 ms, ﬂip angle 80◦. Matrix
64 × 64 voxel, FOV 200 mm). 736 volumes were acquired. After
functional imaging, a 3D T1-weighted high-resolution structural
image of the entire brain (0.8 × 0.8 × 0.8 isotropic voxel size) was
acquired using a fast spoiled gradient recalled sequence.
DATA ANALYSIS
Functional imaging data were analyzed using Statistical Para-
metric Mapping (SPM8, Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, University College London) on Matlab 8.2.0.701
(R2013b). To improve coregistration performance, all images
were ﬁrst manually reoriented so that the origin was set to the
anterior commissure. Then the functional volumes were slice
time corrected, realigned to the ﬁrst volume of the ﬁrst run
and then to the mean across all runs. They were then coregis-
tered to the anatomical image from that subject. The anatomical
image was segmented into tissue probability maps based on stan-
dard stereotaxic space [Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)],
and the transformation parameters used to normalize the func-
tional volumes. Noise was then reduced by smoothing the func-
tional data using a 8-mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian
kernel.
To compare with the previous study (Parris et al., 2009), we
determined the discrete time point of the moment of violation of
expectancy in the magic trick. These time points were extracted
in pilot studies for each trick separately by asking a sample of 15
participants to watch the clips and to quickly press a button in
the moment of expectation violation (i.e., the moment where “the
magic happens”). Their button press was acknowledged by a short
beep. Their reaction times were averaged and used as the time
points for the events for the magic clips. For the control clips we
took the time points that corresponded to the same relative time
than in the magic clip by using the following equation: (surprise
moment time divided by entire length of magic clip) multiplied by
the length of the control clip. This means that if the expectation
violation moment was at 80% of the length of the magic clip, then
the event for the control clip was also set to 80% of the control
clip.
Functional data were analyzed in each single subject using two
univariate multiple regression models. Both models included sep-
arate predictors for magic and control clips, separated by the
order of appearance within a block (ﬁrst or last). In the ﬁrst
model, the events were time-locked to the moment of expecta-
tion violation and the duration of the event was set to 0 as in the
Parris et al. (2009) study. In the second model, we used regres-
sors that were time-locked to the start of the video presentation,
with a variable duration depending on the length of the video
clip. Each single-subject model therefore included four events of
interest corresponding to a 2 × 2 factorial design with factors ﬁlm
type (magic/control) and order (ﬁrst/last). These events were con-
volvedwith the canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF).
The six motion correction parameters from the realignment step
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were modeled separately as events of no interest. The data were
high-pass ﬁltered (cutoff frequency = 0.0078 Hz) to minimize
slow scanner related drifts and global changes were removed by
proportional scaling. For each subject, we computed four contrasts
that averaged the parameter estimates across the two fMRI-runs,
as a function of condition.
The contrast estimates for each subject and condition were
then entered into two whole-brain group-level within-subject
2 × 2 ANOVAs, with the same factors and levels as above, plus
participant effects. One ANOVA analyzed the time point of the
expectation violation, the other ANOVA modeled the entire clip.
All normal subjects were used in both models (N = 25). This
allowed us to test for main effects of order and ﬁlm type as well
as any interactions. Corrections for non-sphericity accounted for
non-independent error terms for the repeated measures as well
as differences in error variance. We then tested for differences
between themagic tricks and the control clips, both asmain effects
and as interactions.
We compared the results of the normal healthy group to the sin-
gle subject results from the magician by calculating the percent of
overlapping supra-threshold voxels for the contrastmagic-control.
In addition, we created a group-level model to test for differences
between the magician and the normal participants for the main
effect of magic tricks vs. control clips, although the informative
value of this analysis is limited due to the group size of one for
the magician. Nonetheless, we tested for similarities between the
two groups using a conjunction analysis with the conjunction null
(Nichols et al., 2005). For comparison with the previous study
and to enable meta-analyses, both the images and the tables are
presented at a threshold of p < 0.001 uncorrected for multiple
comparisons and a voxel extent threshold of 30 voxels. However,
we consider only voxels that survive a voxelwise statistical thresh-
old of p = 0.05 family wise error (FWE) corrected for multiple
comparisons across the entire brain volume for further discussion.
The p < 0.05 FWE corrected p-values are presented in the tables.
Anatomical regions were identiﬁed by manual inspection using
the Juelich Histological Atlas and the Harvard Oxford Structural
Atlas (in FSLView 3.1.8).
RESULTS
The results are organized as follows: ﬁrst, the main effect of expec-
tation violation at the time point of the violation is presented in
our experimental sample (N = 25) and compared to the ﬁndings
of a previous study (Parris et al., 2009). Second, the main effect
of expectation that exists throughout the entire trick is presented.
Third, the individual activity of the magician who performed the
tricks will be presented, using the same contrast. Fourth, the ﬁnd-
ings from the magician will be contrasted with those from the
naïve lay sample.
EXPECTATION VIOLATION (MAGIC – CONTROL): MOMENT OF
VIOLATION
To examine the effect of expectation violation, independent of
when the ﬁlm was presented, we examined the main effect of
magic tricks vs. control clips, at the moment of magic, determined
by independent ratings of each clip (see Materials and Methods).
We did not ﬁnd any supra-threshold voxels for the interactions
between ﬁlm type and order, so we continued to look only at the
main effect of ﬁlm type (magic vs. control). The main difference
between the magic tricks and the control clips is the lack of expec-
tation violation in the latter. The same objects are used in a very
similar action sequence, but without any unexpected outcome.
For example, the magician closes his ﬁst around a silver coin, and
when he opens the ﬁst again, the coin is still there, as expected.
The standard action-outcome sequence is thus preserved in the
control clips.
In this analysis, we saw a left dominant activity that partially
overlapped with those seen in the previous study (Parris et al.,
2009). However, unlike Parris et al. (2009), we did not use a region
of interest analysis and the regions survive after a more stringent
FIGURE 3 | Brain activity at the moment of expectation violation for
magic tricks compared to control clips, independent of presentation
order (main effect, p < 0.001 uncorrected, voxel cluster threshold 30).
The discrete time point of magic was determined by an independent
group of subjects (see Materials and Methods). The color bar depicts the
t -values of the supra-threshold voxels. Activations are overlaid on the
normalized average structural image from all subjects tested, values
represent z -values in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)-coordinates.
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statistical threshold. The regions are reported in Table 1 and
Figure 3. The clusters in the inferior frontal gyrus are very similar
to those found in an action-observation study (Kilner et al., 2009),
which suggests that the action-outcome processing is taking place.
The activity in the occipital lobe is known to process visual motion
(Greenlee, 1999), which would be involved in understanding the
violation of the action-outcome in magic.
Comparison to previous literature
The regions thatweremore active during a violation in expectation
are similar to those found in a previous study with a similar design
(Parris et al., 2009). In particular, the DLPFC (superior frontal
gyrus), and parts of the cingulate gyrus were active bilaterally (see
Table 1; Figure 3). In the previous study, similar regions were
active but in a left-dominant manner. For comparison, results
from Parris et al. (2009) are listed in Table 2.
MAGIC – CONTROL: ENTIRE CLIP DURATION
We then examined the main effect of magic tricks vs. control
clips, for the entire duration of the magic clip. By examining
the entire clip, regions involved in the expectancy through-
out the entire action sequence should be revealed. We found
higher activity in four distinct clusters for magic tricks com-
pared to control clips. These were the head of the CN bilaterally,
the left inferior frontal gyrus and the left anterior insula (see
Table 3; Figure 4). Additional frontal and occipital regions over-
lapping with those found at the time point of the violation
of expectation were also signiﬁcantly active at a more liberal
threshold.
LACK OF EXPECTATION VIOLATION: ACTIVITY IN A MAGICIAN
We assumed that, in contrast to naïve observers, the magician
would not perceive the magic effect as an expectation violation
since he had performed the magic himself and knew the entire
Table 2 | Significant clusters found in Parris et al. (2009) for
comparison magic – control.
Anatomical area from Parris et al. (2009) X Y Z
Left superior frontal gyrus −24 10 58
Left middle frontal gyrus −22 36 44
Left middle frontal gyrus −42 23 26
Left anterior cingulate −4 38 19
Corresponding areas are marked red. We used the program “tal2mni.m” from
http://imaging.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/imaging/MniTalairach to convert their Talairach
coordinates to the MNI values reported here.
action sequence of each trick and each control clip, (see Introduc-
tion). As expected, the activity in themagician’s brain substantially
differed from the activity of our experimental sample. Calculating
the same magic vs. control contrast as before, we found signif-
icant activity in the parietal lobe, namely in the supramarginal
gyrus (which is part of the inferior parietal lobule) bilaterally, in
the right superior parietal lobule as well as in the right postcentral
gyrus, see Table 4; and Figure 5.
There were no overlapping clusters, so it was not possible to
calculate a percent overlap between the two groups. By simply
looking at the corresponding activity maps (Figures 4 and 5), it
is clear that the activity observed in the magician differs from
the one in the experimental sample. For the magician, we found
parietal and sensory-motor activity, whereas the naïve subjects
had active clusters in the more anterior parts of the brain and
the basal ganglia (CN). To additionally conﬁrm this, we con-
ducted a conjunction analysis (with the conjunction null, Nichols
et al., 2005) for the contrast magic – control to identify com-
mon areas of activity between both the magician and the normal
volunteers. However, no common clusters of activity between
the magician and the normal volunteers were found, even at
Table 1 | Activation clusters for comparison magic – control for the discrete time point of the moment of magic (i.e., expectation violation).
Anatomical area X Y Z k t-value PFWE-corr
Left superior lateral occipital cortex −30 −80 28 393 6.33 0.000
Left inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis −52 34 10 40 5.67 0.003
Left anterior supramarginal gyrus −66 −32 32 28 5.47 0.007
Left posterior cingulate gyrus −4 28 40 26 5.45 0.007
Left anterior insula −32 20 −4 33 5.18 0.018
Left superior frontal gyrus −24 10 52 17 5.17 0.019
Right superior lateral occipital gyrus 44 −78 32 12 5.02 0.031
Right middle frontal gyrus 28 8 52 226 4.88 0.049
Right inferior temporal gyrus, temporo-occipital division 62 −56 −8 221 4.79 0.064
Left inferior temporal gyrus, temporo-occipital division −46 −60 −12 148 4.69 0.088
Anterior cingulate gyrus 0 0 26 34 4.23 0.303
Left amygdala −22 −8 −20 50 3.78 0.721
Left anterior insula 34 20 −2 53 3.71 0.775
A voxel cluster threshold 30, p < 0.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons was used, but the p-values for a voxel-wise FWE-corrected threshold are shown.
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates are used.
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Table 3 | Clusters for comparison magic – control throughout the entire clip presentation (voxel cluster threshold 30, p < 0.001, uncorrected).
Anatomical area X Y Z k t-value PFWE-corr
Right caudate nucleus (CN; head) 14 8 14 21 5.26 0.011
Left CN (head) −10 12 6 18 5.24 0.011
Left inferior frontal gyrus −50 32 6 10 5.09 0.019
Left anterior insula −32 22 −6 12 4.93 0.031
Left lateral occipital cortex, superior division −32 −80 26 452 4.87 0.038
Right superior frontal gyrus 28 8 54 244 4.66 0.074
Left superior frontal gyrus −26 10 54 201 4.52 0.111
Left paracingulate gyrus −6 30 38 138 4.43 0.144
Right lateral occipital cortex, superior division 38 −78 28 170 4.13 0.307
Right anterior cingulate gyrus 4 0 26 58 4.10 0.330
Left inferior frontal gyrus −44 4 18 135 4.02 0.395
Right inferior frontal gyrus 44 12 24 183 3.91 0.492
MNI coordinates are used. The p-values for a voxel-wise FWE-corrected threshold are shown.
FIGURE 4 | Brain activity for entire clip duration for the contrast
magic – control (main effect, p < 0.001 uncorrected, voxel cluster
threshold 30). The color bar depicts the t -values of the supra-threshold
voxels. Activations are overlaid on the normalized average structural
image from all subjects tested, values represent z -values in
MNI-coordinates.
the less restrictive threshold of p < 0.001 with 30 consecutive
voxels.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we examined the violation of expected
action-outcome sequences that are pervasive in magic tricks.
When comparing magic tricks with a condition in which the
action-outcome relationship was expected, we found four speciﬁc
clusters of activity in the head of the CN bilaterally, the left infe-
rior frontal gyrus and the left anterior insula. This activity was not
present in the magician who had performed the tricks, and where
we would not expect an expectation violation. The frontal activity
was present at the moment the expected action–outcome contin-
gencywas violated, as well as throughout the entiremagic clip. The
CN,on the other hand,was only signiﬁcantly active throughout the
entire clip but not at the time point of the expectation violation.
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Table 4 | Activity in the magician (Thomas Fraps).
Anatomical area X Y Z k t-value PFWE-corr
Right supramarginal gyrus 60 −26 44 2709 5.65 0.001
Right superior parietal lobule* 26 −56 56 5.21 0.005
Right postcentral gyrus* 52 −34 58 4.95 0.015
Left supramarginal gyrus −58 −34 34 394 5.58 0.001
Right precentral gyrus 54 12 32 144 4.73 0.037
Right inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis 50 10 12 68 4.48 0.097
Left precentral gyrus −52 6 6 84 4.27 0.201
Right premotor cortex 24 −4 50 177 4.11 0.332
Right middle frontal gyrus 44 30 42 58 4.05 0.395
Right premotor cortex 14 2 68 98 3.97 0.487
Right superior lateral occipital cortex 40 −80 26 78 3.96 0.500
Left inferior temporal gyrus, temporooccipital division −44 −58 −10 193 3.74 0.750
Left frontal pole −42 42 24 59 3.74 0.757
Left inferior temporal gyrus, temporooccipital division 56 −56 −12 51 3.73 0.767
Right frontal pole 42 46 8 55 3.63 0.860
Superior parietal lobe −34 −54 52 33 3.41 0.976
Shown are all clusters for comparison magic – control for the entire clip duration (voxel cluster threshold 30, p < 0.001, uncorrected).
Note that MNI coordinates are used. The p-values for a voxel-wise FWE-corrected threshold are shown. Stars delineate sub-clusters that are more than 8 mm from
the center coordinate.
FIGURE 5 | MagicianThomas Fraps: significant activity for magic vs. control condition showing sensory-motor and parietal activity in the magician.
The color bar depicts the t -values of the supra-threshold voxels. Activations are overlaid on the normalized structural image from the magician tested, values
represent z -values in MNI-coordinates.
The presence of subcortical activity may seem surprising at
ﬁrst, but it is now widely accepted that, in addition to their tra-
ditional role in motor processes, the basal ganglia also subserve
higher cognitive functions (Middleton and Strick, 2000). The CN
has been implicated in processing changes in the contingency
between action and outcome for successful goal-directed action
(see Grahn et al., 2008 for a review). Such changes in contingency
are common inmagic tricks, as illustrated in the following example
from our stimulus set (Salt Vanish, see Supplementary Material):
pouring salt into the closed ﬁst of one hand and then slowly
opening the ﬁngers should let the salt trickle down on the table.
The action “opening ﬁngers” starts at once an internal simulation
(e.g., Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001; Grush, 2004) that results in an
expected outcome, namely the salt trickling down. This outcome
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expectation is violated when the salt vanished. As discussed in the
Section “Materials and Methods,” the main difference between the
two conditions in the present study (magic and control) is the
expectation violation that is present in the magic clips but com-
pletely missing in the latter. We argue that in the present study, the
head of the CN is bilaterally activated due to the expectation of an
incongruency between the observed action and the presented out-
come. The CN was not signiﬁcantly active when only the discrete
time point of expectation violation was analyzed; rather it was
active throughout the entire magic clip. This suggests that the CN
is involved in expectation rather than the incongruency itself. This
is reasonable if we assume that in order to experience any violation
in an expected action-outcome congruency, this expectation must
build up during the preceding action sequence that leads to the
unexpected outcome.
The present ﬁndings ﬁt to a previous study that reported theCN
to signal “breaches of expectation” (Schiffer and Schubotz, 2011).
In contrast to the majority of studies (see Diekhof et al., 2012; or
Sescousse et al., 2013 for recent reviews), they investigated caudate
activity not in the context of conditional learning and reward, but
under the assumption that the CN signals violations of expecta-
tions in general, independent of feedback. Schiffer and Schubotz
(2011) used a movement observation paradigm (watching the
movements of a dancer, with unexpected deviations from a previ-
ously learnt choreography), which can be compared to observing
the magician’s unexpected movements.
We believe our results suggest a speciﬁc role of the CN dur-
ing the observation of magic tricks in signaling the expectation
of a violation in an action-outcome sequence, together with the
prefrontal cortex (PFC). The PFC is thought to subserve the ability
to select actions or thoughts to achieve internal goals, based upon
a hierarchy of cognitive function along the anterior–posterior axis
of the lateral PFC (Koechlin and Summerﬁeld, 2007). In this
model of executive function, decisions between multiple prior
cues occur at the most anterior part of the PFC, whereas the
posterior PFC is responsible for interpreting immediate environ-
mental cues for action selection. A recent study showed that this
hierarchy is reﬂected in the cortico-subcortical loop (Jeon et al.,
2014). Branching and episodic control of action activated the
ventrolateral PFC (BA45) in a region very similar to the area
activated in our study and this region was connected to the ante-
rior region of the head of the CN, where we also see activity.
A meta-analysis of 126 PET and fMRI studies uncovered sub-
stantial functional connections between the left CN and the left
inferior frontal gyrus (Postuma and Dagher, 2006). This means,
across a large number of studies and tasks, both regions tended
to be simultaneously active. Although there were no explicit task
demands in our study, it seems plausible that observing a magic
trick involves the conceptualization and expectation of possible
action-outcomes, which relies on the information processing in
the PFC and CN. This interplay is consistent with the activity
in both of these regions throughout the entire magic clip, with
an additional increase in PFC activity during the moment of
expectation violation.
The inferior frontal gyrus activity that we found may to some
degree reﬂect the processing of surprise. Since our study was
designed to increase statistical power with a larger number of
clips, we did not implement a condition controlling for surprise
and thus cannot exclude this possibility. Notably, Parris et al.
(2009) report a similar region (although more ventrally) under-
lying surprise processing. That we found inferior frontal gyrus
activity when exclusively looking at the moment of magic points
into that direction, too. But it is difﬁcult without further exper-
iments, or perhaps a future meta-analysis, to know whether the
inferior frontal region found by Parris et al. (2009) is the same
region found here and whether this corresponds to an overlapping
underlying cognitive process. We are just beginning to understand
the subdivisions and cognitive functions attributed with these
regions.
The anterior insula has been implicated in a wide range
of tasks and cognitive processes (e.g., Craig, 2009; Gasquoine,
2014). Craig (2009) pointed out that these heterogeneous ﬁndings
could be subsumed under the header “awareness” and postu-
lated that the anterior insula is a key area in human awareness
and consciousness. Based on their meta-analysis of 1768 fMRI
experiments, Kurth et al. (2010) suggested the anterior–dorsal
insula as a multimodal integration region, because it was the
only region in which nearly all of the 13 investigated functional
categories (e.g., emotion, empathy, memory, interoception) over-
lapped. It is often found to be co-activated with the ACC, one
of the regions that was also found in the Parris et al. (2009) study
whereACC activity was interpreted asmirroring conﬂict detection
mechanisms.
To a large extent, we were successful in our replication attempt
of Parris et al. (2009). We also found activity in the DLPFC (supe-
rior frontal gyrus), and in parts of the cingulate cortex, when we
used the same timepoint of the analysis. The remaining differences
in activation are likely due to differences in the design, as well as in
the additional condition to control for surprise that was present in
Parris et al. (2009). Also, our analysis was a whole-brain analysis
whereas Parris et al. (2009) analyzed speciﬁc anatomical regions of
interest. One intriguing consensus between the two studies was the
left-dominant activity in the PFC. The left PFC, in particular the
DLPFC, is thought to be involved in interpreting complex actions
(Gazzaniga, 2000; Roser et al., 2005). A previous study on causal-
ity violation also found left-dominant DLPFC activity, which they
associated with reasoning and interpreting the observed events
(Fugelsang andDunbar, 2005). Our results agreewith the previous
ﬁndings.
As hypothesized, the magician’s brain activity differed clearly
from the experimental group. It was mainly parietal activity,
whereas the experimental group had active clusters in the more
anterior parts of the brain and the basal ganglia. That we did not
ﬁnd any overlapping regions in our conjunction analysis shows
that the magician processed the magic tricks and the control clips
differently than lay people and supports our hypothesis that he
did not experience any expectation violations. The most promi-
nent cluster was centered in the supramarginal gyrus bilaterally.
Recently, the right supramarginal gyrus was proposed to subserve
self–other distinction in a paradigm investigating the emotional
egocentricity bias (Silani et al., 2013). In that study, the right
supramarginal gyrus was implicated in overcoming emotional
egocentricity. Since the magician watched himself in the videos,
but was fully aware that other people would be watching the
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clips, too, it seems plausible that he was trying to see himself
with other people’s eyes. However, it is not clear to which extent
emotions played a role in the current paradigm, neither for the
experimental group nor for the magician, because this was not
assessed.
Of course, a comparison between a group and a single subject,
as performed in this work, is methodologically dissatisfying. How-
ever, for the question we were trying to tackle, namely how the
magic tricks would be perceived by someone who knew the action
sequences very well and would thus not experience any expecta-
tion violations, it is difﬁcult to conceive of a better method. Even
testing more magicians (apart from the difﬁculties in recruiting
them) would not have improved the design, since they had not
performed the same tricks. Of course, they might know many of
the tricks, but still perform them in a different manner and thus
not be able to represent and predict the entire action sequence as
well as Thomas Fraps. Thus, it seems difﬁcult to imagine actually
testing a collective. A potential improvement would be to have,
e.g., ﬁve magicians, and all of them perform ﬁve tricks. That is,
in the test condition they will watch 5 self generated and 20 other
generated tricks.
Clearly, the idea of expectation violation in magic tricks can
be related to the concept of prediction errors. A magic effect is
a non-predictable event. The anterior insula, one of the active
clusters found, is thought to process prediction errors and risk
(e.g., Bossaerts, 2010). Although prediction errors are typically
investigated in the context of gambling tasks where participants
make actual decisions, based on their predictions about possi-
ble outcomes of their decision, this could be transferred to the
present situation in which participants might have predicted the
outcome of the observed action – and experienced a prediction
error in the case of an unexpected outcome (i.e., in the magic
clips, but not in the control clips). That we also found activity
in the inferior frontal gyrus, a region implicated in risk pre-
diction error processing and closely connected with the anterior
insula (Bossaerts, 2010), supports this view. Leaving the context
of risk and reward processing, and focusing on a more general
prediction mechanism, Zacks et al. (2007) have introduced the
terms “perceptual predictions” and “perceptual prediction error”
in their theory of event prediction. This might provide a useful
framework to further investigate the special type of expecta-
tion violation in magic tricks that was the focus of the present
work.
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